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Trafimow (2013) rejects the notion that
data can militate against a theory if the
data is wholly irrelevant to the theory. This
very reasonable-sounding argument may
not hold in the important (and common)
case where competing models are being
compared. The underlying issues may be
clarified by way of example.
Consider the active debate on the con-
tributions of fMRI to cognitive theory
(e.g., Mather et al., 2013). It has been
argued that fMRI adds little to cogni-
tive theorizing, because data from fMRI
are fundamentally irrelevant to cognitive
theories pitched at the traditional com-
putational level of analysis (Marr, 1982).
A so-called “consistency fallacy” is said
to be committed when data is treated
as informative simply because some the-
ory is consistent with it (Loosemore and
Harley, 2010; Coltheart, 2013). This fallacy
putatively arises because no other result
could possibly obtain; neuroscientific data
is simply irrelevant to cognitive theories at
this level of analysis.
Both this argument and Trafimow’s
(2013) more general variant of it are, how-
ever, incorrect when any competing theory
assigns a differential prior to the obtained
result. Take the general case described
by Trafimow (2013): some theory assigns
equal likelihood to all possible outcomes
of an experiment. (This is just another
way of saying the data are irrelevant to
it.) The observed data will nonetheless
reduce our belief in the original theory
as compared to some competing theory,
all else being equal, if this competitor had
assigned a higher prior to the obtained
outcome. Conversely, the observed data
will increase our belief in the original the-
ory as compared to a competing theory, if
this competitor had assigned a lower prior
to the obtained outcome. This argument
holds regardless of whether the observed
outcome is a significant difference or a null
effect; Bayes’ rule of course applies in both
these conditions.
That said, it is true that no evidence
can be offered regarding existing theo-
ries if they all assign equal likelihood to
all outcomes, or if they cannot be sub-
ject to model comparison. In practice,
such a situation might less often reflect
sloppy inference than a failure to ade-
quately articulate, develop or embellish a
theory.
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